OrbitOracle.AI — an encrypted notes vault that runs in your browser

← All appsOrbitOracle.AIBeta runs entirely in your browser · nothing uploaded

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Vault

Reading local storage.

Measured parameters

No key derived in this session.

Integrity lab

Select a note, then run a test. Every test decrypts copies held in memory and never writes to storage.

Security scope

The threat model is the browser tab, and the page is built around it. While the vault is unlocked the derived key is held in JavaScript memory, so a script running on this origin — or anyone who controls this machine and this browser profile — can read the plaintext. localStorage is not protected by an OS keychain, so the vault treats it as untrusted storage.

The passphrase is never transmitted and never stored, and no copy of the key exists anywhere else: if you forget it, the ciphertext on this device stays unreadable and there is no reset to fall back on. That is what makes the vault yours and nobody else's.

Key derivation is PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 at an iteration count you choose — 100,000, 310,000 or 600,000 — and the page times the real derivation so you can see what each setting costs. PBKDF2 is not memory-hard, and WebCrypto exposes neither Argon2id nor scrypt, so the page makes no memory-hardness claim; the iteration count is the dial available here.

What stays in plaintext metadata: storage key names, note ids and last-modified timestamps. Titles and bodies are both inside the encrypted payload.

The vault is local-first by construction: the page makes zero network calls, so there is no sync, no shared vault and no recovery agent, and search runs only while the vault is unlocked. Each of those features would need a server or a searchable-encryption scheme, which is exactly what the zero-network design gives up.

Vault

Notes workspace

What is actually stored on this device